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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-------STREVELL PATERSON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Vs.

Case No.

17598

MICHAEL R. FRANCIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant based on Defendant'
written guarantee of the debts of Mountainland Sports, Inc.
Plaintiff had previously obtained a Judgment against said
Corporation which Plaintiff alleges has been unsatisfied.
Defendant filed a Third-Party Claim against DAVID J. TOUSSANT,
seeking indemnity from him to the extent he may be found liable:
Plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A hearing was held in the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County, before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge,

Q',

the 9th day of December, 1980, on Plaintiff's Motion for Summar'
Judgment.

After oral arguements the Court granted Plaintiff's

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Motion and signed an Order to that effect on the 29th day of
December, 1980.

Notice of Appeal was timely filed within the

extended time period granted the Defendant-Appellant in the Court
below.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant respectfully requests that the Supreme Court
vacate the Summary Judgment entered against Defendants in the
District Court below and remand the case for further proceedings.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about January 19, 1977, Defendants, MICHAEL R. FRANCIS,
and LLOYD UNGRICHT, signed a guarantee whereby they agreed to
personally and continually guarantee payment of the purchase price
of all goods and merchandise sold to Mountainland Sports, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation") by Plaintiff
STRAVELL PATERSON.
of the Corporation.

Defendant was then a stockholder and Director
This guarantee could be revoked by the

guarantors upon giving 30-days written notice thereof to STRAVELL
PATERSON, leaving the guarantors liable only as to past debts of
the Corporation.
On or about the first day of April, 1978, Defendant, MICHAEL
R. FRANCIS, sold all interest he owned in the Corporation to DAVID

-2-
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J. TOUSSANT, and notified Plaintiff, STRAVELL PATERSON, of the
sale in writing and further exercised his right to terminate~
guarantee.
On or about the 5th day of April, 1978, Plaintiff by its
agent, MR. GANETT, acknowledged the above Notice of Defendant,
MICHAEL R. FRANCIS.

Plaintiff, through its agent, KEITH HYATT,

offered to release Defendant, MICHAEL R. FRANCIS, from all
liability, including past liability, under his guarantee of the
debts of the Corporation if Defendant, MICHAEL R. FRANCIS, as
agent for the Corporation, would sign a Promissory Note and
Security Agreement obligating the Corporation for a certain
amount.

Defendant, MICHAEL R. FRANCIS, did in fact execute a

Promissory Note and Security Agreement as agent for said
Corporation in exchange for Plaintiff's promise that his persona:
guarantee for the Corporate debt would be entirely cancelled anc
released.
The Corporation apparently only made partial payments to tn:
Plaintiff, STRAVELL PATTERSON, for its outstanding debts and a
Default Judgment was rendered against the Corporation for the
unpaid balance.

The trial court in that case ordered the

remaining inventory of the Corporation sold and applied to ~e
Judgment.

Plaintiff then brought this action seeking to enforce

Defendant's guarantee of the Corporation's debts.

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN SPITE OF CERTAIN
UNRESOLVED DISPUTES REGARDING MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT
The purpose of Summary Judgment is to bar from the Courts
unnecessary litigation.

This occurs only when the pleadings,

depositions, affidavits, and admissions show there are no genuine
issues of material fact and one Party is entitled to Judgment as a
matter of law.

In re Williams Estate, 348 P.2d 683 (Utah 1960);

Harvey vs. Sanders, 534 P.2d 905 (Utah 1974).

However, Summary

Judgment should not be granted when it appears that there are
disputed issues of fact, which if resolved in favor of the
nonmoving Party, would entitle it to prevail.
Bitters, 500

P~2d

Wingets, Inc. vs.

1007 (Utah 1972).

Defendant-Appellant does not deny that the Promissory Note,
upon which Plaintiff brought this action, was duly executed by the
Corporation, but asserts that said Note was given in exchange for
an agreement by the Plaintiff to release the Defendant from any
liability as a guarantor.

Plaintiff obviously disputes

-4-
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Defendant's account of the oral release of Defendant from

a~

potential guarantor liability, but Plaintiff asserts that any su:'
agreement is void, as within the statute of frauds and for faik
of consideration in any event.
The very heart of this matter centers around Defendant's
guarantee of the Corporate liability and the Defendant's effort
to prove an oral release made by the Plaintiff upon receipt
of a Note and Security agreement from the Corporation.

In

Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories and Requestfu
Admissions dated April 7, 1980, the Defendant asserted by meansc'
a sworn statement the existence of an oral release made by the
Plaintiff through a "KEITH HYATT".

(Answer to Interrogatory

Number l; Answer to Interrogatory Number 4)

In

Holbrook Company vs. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975) this Court
vacated the Trial Court's Summary Judgment and remanded the
for further proceedings.

~u

The Court said:

(I)t only takes one sworn statement under oath to
disputes the averments on the other side of the
controversy and creates an issue of fact. This is
analogous to the elemental rule that the fact trier
may believe one witness as against many, or, many
against one •.•
It is not the purpose of the Summary Judgment procedure
to judge the credibility of the averments of Parti:s,
or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither is.
it to deny Parties the right to a trial to resolve dis-.
.
. t e the time,
puted issues of fact. Its purpose is
to e 1.imina

-5-
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trouble and expense of trial when upon any view taken of
the facts as asserted by the Party ruled against, he
would not be entitled to prevail. Only when it so appears
is the Court justified in refusing such a Party the
opportunity of presenting his evidence and attempting
to persuade the fact trier to his views. Conversly if
there is any dispute as to any issue, material to the
settlement of the controversy, the Summary Judgment
should not be granted. (Emphasis added) 542 P.2d at 193.
Defendant-Appellant has alleged in a sworn statement the
existance of an oral release by the Plaintiff herein as to the
Defendant's liability as a Guarantor for the Corporation's debts.
This alone suffices to create a dispute as to a material issue of
fact which precludes the granting of Summary Judgment.

Therefore

the Trial Court's granting of the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment was error, and should be vacated by this Court.
In Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. vs. Robinson, 604 P.2d 113
(Utah 1979) this Court reversed and remanded a Trial Court's
Judgment notwithstanding the verdict against Defendant's
Counterclaim.

The Court stated:

(T)he right of trial by jury is one which should be
carefully safeguarded by the Courts, and when a
Party has demanded such a Trial, he is entitled to
have the benefit of the jury's findings on issues of
fact; and it is not the Trial Court's prerogative to
disregard or nullify them by making findings of his
own. Therefore, in ruling on motions which take
issues of fact from the jury (this includes both
Motions for directed Verdict and Judgment not Withstanding the Verdict), the Trial Court is o~liged
to look at the evidence and all reasonable inferences
-6-
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that fairly may be drawn therefrom in the light
favorable to the Party moved against; and the granting
of such a Motion is justified only if, in so viewing
the evidence, there is no substantial basis therein
which would support verdict in his favor.
On appeal,
in considering the Trial Court's granting of such
Motions, we will look at the evidence in the same
manner. 604 P.2d at 917.
A Motion for Summary Judgment obviously takes the issue of
fact from the jury.

Therefore the Trial Court below should

have looked at the evidence wilh all reasonable inferences in tr.'
Defendant's favor.

Because the Defendant has submitted a sworn

statement alleging a dispute upon a material issue of fact in thi
case, the Court erred in granting the Plaintiff's Summary
Judgment.

For that reason, and the reasons stated below,

~is

Court should vacate the Summary Judgment in favor of Plaintiff
entered in the Trial Court and remand the case for further
proceedings below.

POINT II
THE AGREEMENT TO RELEASE DEFENDANT AS GUARANTOR
WAS OBTAINED IN EXCHANGE FOR THE CORPORATION'S
EXECUTION OF A PROMISSORY NOTE TO THE PLAINTIFF,
AND WAS NOT REQUIRED TO BE IN WRITING.
A. The disputed release is not with~n
the Statute of Frauds and need not be written.

-7-
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Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment cited Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 25-5-4, the
Statute of Frauds, which requires that agreements to answer for
the debt, default, or miscarriage of another be in writing or be
void.

Plaintiff failed to cite Section 25-5-6, which provides in

part:
A promise to answer for the obligation of another in
any of the following cases is deemed an original obligation of the Promissor and need not be in writing:
(3) where the promise, being for an antecedent obligation of another, is made upon consideration that the
Party receiving it cancel the antecedent obligation,
accepting the new promise as a substitute therefori
(Emphasis added)
The language of this Statute excludes the disputed release of
Defendant as Guarantor from being within the Stutute of Frauds.
The Promissory Note was executed by the Defendant as agent of the
Corporation, and in consideration of the Plaintiff's promise to
cancel! the Defendant's personal obligation as Guarantor of
Corporate debts.

The Corporation had no obligation to execute a

Note and Security Agreement, and Defendant personally had no
obligation to execute the Note and Security Agreement.

The

agreement by the Corporation to execute the Note and Security
Agreement was obtained in exchange for the Plaintiff's release of
the Defendant in his personal capacity as

Guarantor.

Plaintiff's

-8-
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act in receiving the Promissory Note and Security Agreement
cancelled the Defendant's personal obligation regarding Corpora•,
debts.

Because the oral promise by the Plaintiff through its

agent, KEITH HYATT, was not void as being within the Statue of
Frauds, Defendant should have the opportunity to present
evidence to establish the nature of the transaction between the
Parties.
The only writings which evidence the transaction

disput~~

the Parties herein are the Note and Security Agreement which the
Defendant signed as agent for the Corporation.

It is well

established that parol evidence is not admissible to vary the
terms of a written instrument.

But the documents referred to

above do not deal with the release of Defendant in his

Guaru~

capacity and no attempt is being made to vary their terms.
this regard the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
The inquiry is whether the writing was intended to
cover a certain subject of negotiation; for if it
was not, then the writing does not embody the transaction on that subject ••. whether a particular subject of negotiation is embodied by the writing
depends fully on the intent of the Parties thereto ...
This intent must be sought •.• in the conduct and language of the Parties and surrounding circumstances ...
The question being whether certain suhjects of negotiation were intended to be covered, we must compare
the writing and the negotiations before we can determine whether they were, in fact, covered •.. in
deciding upon this intent the chief and most satis-

-9-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In

factory index for the Judge is found in the circumstances, whether or not the particular element of the
alleged extrinsic negotiation is dealt with at all in
the writing.
If it is mentioned, covered, or dealt
with in the writing, then presumably the writing
was meant to represent all of the transaction on that
element; if it is not, then probably the writing was
not intended to embody that element of the negotiation.
(Citing Whigmore) Farr vs. Wasatch Chemical Company,
143 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah 1943).
In the case at bar the only writings which evidence the
disputed transaction are the Note and Security Agreement.

The

writings do not mention, cover, or deal with the release of
Defendant as guarantor.

This is so because the Note and Security

Agreement were not intended to contain all aspects of the
transaction.
by

Plaintiff's oral release may, therefore, be proven

the "conduct and language of the Parties and the surrounding

circumstances", and evidence should be received on that point at
Trial.
In Christensen vs. Abbott, 595 P.2d 900,902 (Utah 1979), this
Court stated:
(T)he parol evidence rule is not applicable to a
writing which is not intended by the Parties as
a final and complete expression of their bargain.
In that case the Supreme Court upheld the admission by the
Trial Court of oral evidence concerning the cancellation of a
Promissory Note, and held that the parol evidence rule was not

-10-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

violated because the Note and an accompanying Assumption Agree>
were not intended as a total expression of the parties
transaction.

In the case at bar, Defendant alleges that the

release agreement was not intended to be covered in the written
Promissory Note or Security Agreement.

And because of the oral·

nature of the Release Agreement Defendant should have been

al~

the opportunity to present evidence as to its scope and effect:
a trier of fact.
In Oberhansly vs. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977) the

U~

Supreme Court stated:
The burden of proving the existence of a contract
is on the Party seeking the enforcement of it. Of
course the intentions of the Parties are controlling,
and normally these intentions would be found in the
instrument itself.
If a writing is not sufficient
to establish meaning, however, resort may be had to
extraneous evidence manifesting the intentions of the
Parties. 572 P.2d at 1386.
The actions of the Corporation and Defendant as agent of~
Corporation in executing a Promissory Note and Security
Agreement portend something more than a desire to be accommoda•i
to the Plaintiff herein.

There is no reasonable explaination

fr

why the Defendant herein on behalf of the Corporation wouM ~~
executed the Promissory Note and Security Agreement unless ~·
benefit would have been obtained thereby.

The benefit which

-11-
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Defendant alleges is the release by the Plaintiff of the Defendant
in his individual capacity for all debts of the Corporation, past
or present.

Defendant seeks the opportunity to present evidence

at Trial which will support this allegation, and is anxious to
meet his burden of showing the intentions of the Parties by their
conduct and by attendant circumstances.
It is well settled that the parol evidence rule does not have
any application to subsequent agreements.

Therefore evidence of

subsequent modifications of an integration may be shown even if it
contradicts the original statement.

Contracts, Calamari & Perillo

2nd Ed. West Publishing Co., Section 3-7.

Because the oral

release by Plaintiff of Defendant in his Guarantor capacity was a
modification of an original contract whereby Defendant did
guarantee Corporate debts, parol evidence is admissible to
establish the nature of that modification.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 70A-2-202 of the Uniform
Commercial Code provides:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda
of the Party agree, or, which are otherwise set forth
in a writing intended by the Parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms
as are included therein may not be contradicted by
evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous
oral agreement, but may be explained by (a) course of
dealing or usage of trade or by course of performance;
and (b) by evidence of consistent additional terms un-

-12-
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less the Court finds the writing to have been intended
also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms
of the agreement.
The oral release by Plaintiff of Defendant does not
contradict the Note and Security Agreement, but it explains wh\
these instruments were executed.

The Note and Security

Agre 9 ~

executed by Defendant in his capacity as agent were not intende:
by the Parties as a final expression of their agreement only as
the agreed-upon amount of Corporate indebtedness and
therefor.

securi~

The writings were intended to provide a benefit tot''

Plaintiff in coming to an agreement with a Corporation as

~

0

extent of its obligations, and evidencing the extent of that de"
in clear and uncertain terms, as well as to secure that debt
the inventory owned by the Corporation.

b::

These writings were no:

intended to contain the agreement between Plaintiff and Defendac·
as to the release of Defendant's individual liability as Guaran::
of Corporate debts.

Therefore the writings were not a total

integration of _the Party's overall agreement.

Comment 3 of the

above-cited section states that under the Code there is not a
total integration unless the alleged additional terms "would
certainly have been included in the document in view of the
Court".

That is, for there to be a total integration which wo''·

exclude any parol evidence regarding the oral release, the Tr~

-13-
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Court would have to find as a matter of law that the Parties
intended to include all aspects of their transaction in the
Promissory Note and Security Agreement signed by the Defendant as
agent of the Corporation.

As noted above, Defendant has submitted

a sworn statement in answering Plaintiff's Interrogatories which
disputes this allegation.

Therefore the existence and terms of

this oral release are material issues of fact disputed by the
Parties in the instant case, and the Trial Court improperly
granted Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Guarantee Agreement on behalf of the Corporation by
MICHAEL FRANCIS and LLOYD UNGRICHT contains a clause requiring
that revocation by said Guarantors of prospective liability could
be obtained only by written notice after thirty (30) days had
expired.

This requirement in no way renders void the oral release

by the Plaintiff through its agents.

The

guarantee clause

requires that a written notice of termination must be sent in
order to abrogate the Guarantor's liability for any future debts
of the Corporation.

This Notice was sent by the Defendant and

received by the Plaintiff, and is not the subject of the dispute
between the Parties.

The oral release which Defendant seeks to

establish on behalf of the Plaintiff resulted from a subsequent
transaction and concerns the liability of Defendant as Guarantor

-14-
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for past Corporate debts,

including the Promissory Note.

Ther~

fore an oral agreement is sufficient to release Defendant froot
liability as Guarantor of Corporate debts.
B. No consideration is required for an instrument
given as security for an antecedent obligation.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 70A-3-408 of the Utah Unifum
Commercial Code provides:
Want or failure of consideration is a defense against a~
person not having the right of a holder in due course,
except that no consideration is necessary for an instrument or obligation thereon given in payment of or as
security for an anticedent obligation of any kind ...
Comment Two to that Section provides:
The "Except" Clause is intended to remove the difficulties
which have arisen where a note or a draft, or an endorsemen:
of either, is given as payment or security for a debt
already owed by the party giving it, or by a third party ...
In the case at bar, Plaintiff's oral promise to release
Defendant from his individual liability as Guarantor of corporat!
debt was obtained by the Defendant giving the Plaintiff a
Promissory Note and Security Agreement on behalf of the
Corporation.

Therefore, no separate consideration was necesn0

for Plaintiff to be bound in releasing Defendant from his
liability.

By the Corporation executing a valid note and securit

agreement the Plaintiff became bound on it's promise to releaH
Defendant.

-15-
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In Castle & Co. vs. Bagley , 467 P.2d 408 (Utah 1970) this
Court affirmed the decision that the Trial Court rendered in favor
of the Plaintiff.

There the Defendant orally agreed to personally

pay any prior indebtedness of his company, if the Plaintiff would
extend him further credit and deliver merchandise to him.
Defendant there executed a Promissory Note in his individual
capacity, but later refused to pay said Note.

The Trial Court

concluded that no consideration for the Note executed by the
Defendant was necessary for the obligation to be binding upon
Defendant.

In the case at Bar, the maker of the Note, the

corporation, had no obligation to give the Note to the Plaintiff
herein, but did so upon reaching an agreement as to the amount of
corporate obligation and the release of the Defendant from his
guarantee of that corporate debt.

Therefore Plaintiff should be

bound by it's oral promise to release the Defendant from his
individual liability, and the Trial Court's granting of Summary
Judgment against Defendant without hearing evidence thereon, was
improper.
Under the sales portion of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code,
Section 70A-2-201 (1) one finds: "An agreement modifying a
contract within this article needs no consideration to be
binding."

The Section does not require the modifying agreement to

-16-
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be writen except in two instances.

First a writing is r1

the contract, as modified, is withing the Staute of Frau1
provision of the Code, or, second, if the original contr
its terms, excludes modification or recission by mutual
except by a writing.

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Utah Un

Commercial Code, Section 70A-2-209 (2)

(3).

Since the d

transaction does not come within the Statute of Frauds,
writing is not required for a recission or cancellation
liability for past debts by the terms of the agreement i
there need not have been consideration given by the Part
agreement to release Defendant herein from his liability
Corporate Guarantor.

In any event pre-UCC case law has held that the giv
a Note and Mortgage as an additional security for a predebt is done upon valuable consideration.
349 P.2d 385 (Utah 1964)
1962).

1

Abraham vs. A

Bowman vs. White, 369 P.2d 962

The fact that the Corporation gave to the Plaint

Promissory Note and Security Agreement which it had prev
never given to Plaintiff, was sufficient consideration t
the oral agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant bindi
Plaintiff.

This act clearly benefited the Plaintiff in

now had a sum certain upon which it couln hold the Corpe
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accountable, which was not clearly fixed or agreed upon prior to
that time, and it further secured said indebtedness by means of a
Security Agreement covering the Corporation's inventory.
C. The agreement whereby Plaintiff received a Note
and Security Agreement from the Corporation in exchange for Plaintiff's release of Defendant in his
Guarantor capacity constitutes an accord and
satisfation.
Plaintiff argued below that the receipt by it of the
Promissory Note and Security Agreement by the Corporation cannot
discharge Defendant's guarantee for Corporate debts because the
Corporation was already obligated and indebted to Plaintiff.
However the Corporation had no duty to give Plaintiff the
Promissory Note referred to, nor enter into a Security
Agreement which covered its inventory.

Rather the Corporation,

through its agent who is the Defendant herein, was induced to do
so at the request of Plaintiff, and therefore,
detriment in executing the documents.

~uffered

a legel

The amounts which the

Corporation owed the Plaintiff on an open account basis became a
sum certain and an admitted liability by the Corporation.

Because

the Parties agreed to compromise their claims against each other
and settled on an amount for which the Corporation would be
indebted to the Plaintiff, and Plaintiff received a Note and
Security Agreement as requested, and Plaintiff agreed to release
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the Defendant as to his individual liability, the guarantee of
Defendant should be discharged because of an accord and
satisfaction.

Utah's highest Court has stated:

This doctrine requires that there be a dispute
or uncertainty as to the amount due and that the
Parties enter into an agreement that the debtor will
pay and the creditor will accept, the lesser amount
as a compromise of their differences and in satisfaction of the debt ••. it must clearly appear that
the Parties so understood and entered into a new and
substitute contract.
To itate the matter in traditional contract writting: That there was a definite
meetings of the minds on such an agreement.
Tates, Inc. vs. Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d
1228, 1229 (Utah 1975).
This Court has further stated:
An accord and satisfaction is a method of discharging
a contract or settling a claim arising from a contract,
by substituting for such contract or claim an agreement for the satisfation therein, and the execution
of the substituted agreement.
To constitute an accord and satisfaction there must
be an offer in full satisfaction of the obligation,
accompanied by such acts and declarations as amount
to a condition that if it is accepted, it is to be
in full satisfaction, and the condition must be
such that the Party to whom the of fer is made is
bound to understand that if he accepts ·it, he does
so subject to the conditions imposed ••• the accord
is the agreement and the satisfaction is the execution or performance of such an agreement. ~
vs. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383,
1386 (Utah 1977), citing 1 Am.Jur.2d, Accord and
Satisfaction, 1.
That Court noted that where consideration is necessary for
the substitute agreement, consideration may rest on the settler;
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of the dispute.

In the instant case the Trial Court, by entering

Summary Judgment against Defendant below, denied the Defendant the
opportunity to present evidence that the Parties reached an accord
as to how to discharge their various disputed debts, and that
satisfaction thereof was obtained by the Plaintiff which received
a Note and Security Agreement from the Corporation.

However

Defendant herein was denied his satisfaction in that he was not
released as Guarantor for Corporate debts as the Plaintiff had
promised.

By denying the Defendant an opportunity to present

evidence as to the substituted agreement, the Trial Court
improperly decided a disputed issue of material fact in favor of
the Plaintiff without hearing evidence thereon.
In Christensen vs. Abbott, supra, the Utah Supreme Court
upheld a Trial Court decision which allowed the cancellation of a
Promissory Note after receiving evidence of an oral agreement
constsituting an accord and satisfaction.

The Court noted that

"There is no requirement that an accord and satisfaction must be
in writing". 595 P.2d at 902.

As to the argument that allowing

evidence of an oral agreement to cancel the Promissory Note would
violate the parol evidence rule, the Court stated:
{T)he parol evidence rule is not applicab~e to a
writing which is not intende~ by the P~rties a~
a final and complete expression of their bargain.
Here the District Court's conclusions necessarily
contemplate a finding that the written agreement
-20-
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was not intended as the total expression of the
agreement •.. We believe that such a finding is
correct and hold that the Court properly received
the evidence of the alleged oral agreement concerning the cancellation of the Note. 595 P.2d at
902,903.
The fact that the accord and satisfaction alleged by
Defendant herein is not in writing does not prevent the Trial
Court from allowing evidence in establishing the same.

And

since Defendant has submitted a sworn statement alleging the
I

existence of such an agreement, a disputed issue of material lac:'
exists precluding a granting of Summary Judgment on behalf of
either Party.

Defendant alleges in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of hi'

Answer the factual basis for his affirmative defenses,
accord and satisfation.

includin~

Although the words of accord and

satisfaction are not specifically used, the transactions therein
described clearly constitute a basis for that defense and should
be sufficient.

Counsel for Defendant argued the same point oral:

before the Trial Court below.

Whether or not there was an accori

and satisfaction is a question of fact upon which the Court hua
duty to hear evidence.

Therefore the Trial Court's granting of

the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was improper and
should be vacated.
The Defendant does not assert that the giving of the Note a~
Security Agreement by the Corporation to the Plaintiff herein
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extinguished the Defendant's liability automatically, by
operation of law.

Rather Defendant asserts that it was an

express agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant on behalf of
the Corporation that Defendant's personal liability would be
cancelled.

It is not the giving of the Note which released the

Defendant of his liability as Guarantor, but the agreement by the
Plaintiff to accept the Note and Security Agreement in exchange
for the release which cancelled the Defendant's liability.

In

Ford Motor Credit Company vs. Bob Jones Interprises, Inc., 240
F.Supp. 667 (Colo. Dist.

1965) the Court considered the question

of release by operation of law.

After noting that the giving of a

Note does not by itself satisfy an obligation and release the
Guarantor, the Court stated:
It is, of course, possible to contract to release
a guarantee such as this by the giving of the Note
but the intention to do so must be apparant ..•
(T)o bring about a discharge, it would have to appear
that an accord and satisfaction had been intended
by the delivery of this subsequent Note.
In that case the Court looked to the intention of the Parties
as manifested in the surrounding circumstances and basic facts
which might give rise to any inference of their intent.
Trial Court in the case at bar failed to allow this.

But the

Defendant

was therefore improperly prevented from presenting evidence

-22-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

regarding the Parties intentions about the disputed transaction.
This again is a material issue of fact as to whether the

No~

given by the Corporation in connection wit11 the Security Agre~ro·
was a renewal of a prior Corporate obligation, as the Plaintiff
contends, of whether there was, in fact, a new agreement in lk
of the earlier one, as contended by the Defendant.

The Trial

Court's Summary Judgment in favor of Plaintiff improperly decW
a material issue of fact disputed by the Parties without receiv:·
evidence thereon, which Judgment should be vacated.

POINT III
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ALLEGE OR PROVE COMPLIANCE
WITH THE TERMS OF ITS PRIOR JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
CORPORATION, THUS PRECLUDING PLAINTIFF 1 S PRESENT
CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT.
The default Judgment rendered for Plaintiff herein against
the Corporation, exhibit "D" in Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, contains an Order that:
The inventory of stock in trade of Defendant, MOUNTAINLAND SPORTS, INC., including all materials to be used
or consumed in the business of said Defendant, and all
products of said Defendant, possessed or maintained by
the Defendant in connection with its business, and all
Defendant's personal property, furniture, furnishings,
equipment and fixtures be sold in a commercially reasonable manner in accordance with the Utah Uniform Com-23-
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1

mercial Code and the proceeds therefrom shall be applied
to the amount owing from the Defendant to Plaintiff as
provided herein. (Empasis added)
Nowhere has the Plaintiff made any allegations that the
provisons of this Order and the Judgment have been followed or
complied with, other than the sweeping assertion that: "the
Judgment has not been satisfied".
paragraph 4)

(Plaintiff's Complaint,

Nowhere does the Plaintiff allege that any efforts

have been made towards a private or public sale of the property
covered by the Security Agreement as ordered by the prior Court.
No claim has been made that an effort to levy on the property of
the Defendant in the prior action was made and was unsuccessful.
No statement or allegation by the Plaintiff has been made which
might account for any proceeds from such sale, if one was held.
Failure by the Plaintiff to establish its compliance with the
terms of the Judgment rendered by the prior Court against the
Corporation is fatal to whatever cause of action might now seek to
establish.

That Court's affirmative Order that the goods and

inventory of the Corporation be sold in a commercially reasonable
manner and in accordance with the provisions of the Utah UCC
requires certain acts by the Plaintiff in order for it to proceed
upon that debt.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section ?OA-9-504 states:

-24-
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Disposition of the collatoral may be by public or
private proceedings and may be made by one or more
contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a
unit or in parcels and at any time and place upon
any terms, but every aspect of the disposition, including the method, manner, time, and place, must be
commercially reasonable ••• reasonable notification
of the time and place of any private sale or any
other intended disposition is to be made shall be
sent by the secured Party to the debtor.
This Court has held that the creditor's failure to compfy
with the requirements governing disposition of repossessed
collateral serves as an absolute bar to the creditor's right to:'
deficiency judgment.

FMA Financial Corp. vs Pro-Printers, 590
I

P.2d 803

(Utah 1979).

(Hereinafter Pro-Printers)

In the insta1·

case Plaintiff seeks to establish that Defendant now stands int'·'
shoes of the debtor-corporation, and he should be individual~
liable therefore. By that logic the Defendant herein would need:
receive all notices of the sale and disposition of the
Corporation's goods and assets which the UCC requires be given tc
the debtor.

If Plaintiff has,

indeed, executed on the goods H

ordered by the prior Court, then Plaintiff had the responsibilitV
of giving Defendant herein reasonable notice of the sale and
conducting the sale in a commercially reasonable manner.

In~

Printers, supra, this Court stated:
(T)he secured Party has the burden of establishing that
the disposition of the property was done in a com- .
mercially reasonable manner and that reasonable notice
to the debtor (s) was given. We have held that a guarantor,
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

We have have held that a Guarantor, •.. is a debtor
under the Uniform Commercial Code, and therefore
entitled to notice under 70A-9-Sd4(3). (Emphasis added)
590 P.2d at 806, 807.
In the instant case Plaintiff has obviously not met the
burden of establishing reasonable notice in a commercially
reasonable manner, because Plaintiff has never alleged, and
Defendant has in fact never received notice whatsoever in this
regard. Plaintiff's failure to-give Defendant the statutorily
required notice is fatal to its cause of action, and certainly
precludes summary judgment in its favor in this action.
Plaintiff has also failed to allege whether or not a
sale--reasonable or not--occurred or efforts to that end were ever
made, as ordered by the Trial Court.

These are essential

requirements which must be alleged and proven before Plaintiff can
prevail upon his alleged cause of action. In
Chrysler Credit Corp. vs. Burns, 562 P.2d 233 (Utah 1977) this
Court held that where no notice of time, date, place and manner of
sale was given to a debtor by a secured ParEy-Seller, the sale was
not commercially reasonable and, not only was the Creditor not
entitled to a dificiency judgment or attorney's fees, but the
debtor was entitled to damages for the secured Party's failure to
comply with the statute governing repossession and sale under
Section 70A-9-507.

Plaintiff has no where alleged compliance with
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these provisions, and these defects are fatal to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment and his cause of action as well.
Therefore the Trial Court improperly granted the Plaintiff Sum~a::
Judgment without requiring the Plaintiff to allege, much less
prove, compliance with the UCC requirements for disposing of the
Coporation's secured collateral.

CONCLUSION

Because of the many disputed issues of material fact which
exist in this case, the Trial Court's granting of Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment was improper as a matter of law. Th:'
case cannot be decided without receiving evidence on the ma~
disputed issues of material fact alleged by both Parties.
Defendant has alleged a sufficient factual basis which would, if
resolved in his favor, defeat Plaintiff's claims.

Plaintiff's

cause of action contains defects which, if resolved in Defendant''
favor, would prevent the Trial Court from ruling for the
Plaintiff. The Trial Court's granting of Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment was error and should be reversed by this Court.
Defendant therefore respectfully requests this Court to
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vacate~'~

Trial Court's Order of Summary Judgment in favor of Plaintiff and
to remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this _i_f}iaay of June, 1981.
Respectfully submitted,
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT
ESPLIN & ANDERSON
By

CERTIF'ICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed t~o copies of the foregoing
i:3rief of Appellant t_c-, DANNY C. KELLY & DAVID J. JORDAN, of VAN
COT1', BAGLEY, CORNWAL & MC CARTHY, Attorneys for PlaintiffRc>s~j·.ncient at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
- - / . day of June, 1981.
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Trial Court's Order of Summary Judgment in favor of Plaintiff and
to remand the case for further proceedings.
DATED this

1f~ day of June, 1981.
Respectfully submitted,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to the Utah Attorney General, DAVID WILKINSON,
at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this _!if/J_ day
of June, 1981.

~_z~d_i~h~
--Secretary
'~7
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